澳大利亚公共服务支付的绩效工资前言员工绩效是现代企业管理者必须考虑的重要因素之一，是推动公司走向成功的重要因素之一。现在的公司得到了更多的资源，以达到组织的目标，这些资源对融合最佳人力资源管理实践是必不可少的。员工对任何公司来说都是的重要资产，管理他们的绩效，从而成为实现这些目标的一个关键价值驱动力。服务行业的企业更加需要确保他们注重员工绩效，以更好的方式发展他们。该报告旨在分析在澳大利亚公共服务中实施的绩效薪酬制度的影响。通过一步一步地分析各种事件，使各种缺陷很容易被理解。该报告还帮助我们分析错误，同时使我们能够确定最佳实践的行业。公司已经对生产率水平上升后列入绩效为基础的薪酬进行了充分的讨论，却很少有人会注意到公司也会因功绩而遭受损失。澳大利亚公共服务是以绩效为基础的薪酬却不能够激励员工的典型案例之一。因此，我决定把这个作为我的研究课题。Performance based pay in the Australian public serviceIntroductionEmployee performance is one of the important factors that modern day managers have to consider for propelling their company towards success. These days, companies have become more resource centric and it is essential to blend the best HRM practices to reach organisational goals. People are important assets for any company and managing their performance thus becomes a key value driver for attaining those goals. The firms in the service sector need to ensure that they lay emphasis on employee performance and develop them in a better manner.The report aims at analysing the effects of the performance based pay system that was implemented in the Australian Public Services. It analyses various events in a step by step manner so that various flaws are easily understood. The report also helps us in analysing mistakes that are normally committed and at the same time enables us to identify the best practices in the industry.Enough discussion has already been had on the companies whose productivity levels shot up after the inclusion of performance based pay, but very little discussion has taken place on organisations who suffered due to merit based pay. The Australian Public Service is one of the classic cases in which performance based pay was not able to motivate the employees. Therefore, I decided to take this up as my topic of study.2.0 基于绩效的澳大利亚公共服务支付Performance Based Pay in the Australian Public ServiceNegotiations for having a performance based pay system have been going on between the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) and public sector unions since the late 1980s. Later on further negotiations took place in enterprise bargaining agreement for the Australian Public Service late in November 1991. A basic frame work for the guide lines was formed after this point and, in 1992, performance based pay came into force in the Australian Public service (Wright, 1995). Even though the frame work was acceptable to many it was not to the taste of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission as they said that this scheme was not compatible with the existing rules and rates that existed in the public services. Eventually after long negotiations across various bodies it came into force on December 4, 1992 and was drafted into the Australian Public Service Work place bargaining agreement. This was signed by both the Labour Government and Public Sector Trade Unions (Department of Industrial Relations, 1993c). This agreement made the agency heads responsible for determining the band of pay and the levels of merit pay to be made to senior officials and senior executive services. They were required to follow the guidelines of performance based pay as per DIR. Agencies were expected to avoid forcing the rule as it was expected to spread itself over a period of time across all the institutions. This was specifically done so as to avoid the resistance from the employees to any such changes in the system especially when it is related with that of their pay package (Wright, 1995).Bonus payments were the main part of the bouquet of benefits that were there. A budget supplement of more than half of the maximum pay for each official who are eligible under the scheme funded this performance based pay (Geary, 1992). The bargaining agreement in 1992 allowed all these performance bonuses to be pooled down into a fund which may be used for the increase in pay of all workers and at the same time improve the working condition using them. Most of the public service organisations started working on the same and initial payments of performance bonuses were made in 1993.3.0初始阶段评价 Evaluation of the Initial PhaseAfter this first round of pay took place, an inquiry was set up to take a look at various plans that were implemented by the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration. This inquiry raised many concerns such as lobbying and the politicization of office circles, absence of objective measures to divide people into various bands based on their performance and various other issues that were beyond the control of the agency heads (Considine, 1990). Many critics were of the view that such a system would reduce productivity, as it basically was divisive in nature. Furthermore, the way in which the structure was forced into the system when they lacked sufficient administrative resources rendered it ineffective.Difference in work cultures across the organisations and the change into a frictional system were pointed out as the reasons for the initial glitches that took place in the system. Gary Johns, The Minister of Public Administrations, called for a major cultural change in the organisations so as to make this a success. Government was busy brushing the issues under the carpet by mentioning to the "newness of the scheme" and "speed of execution" with which the employees and the agency heads could not keep up with. However DIR agreed that many officials were paid almost the same amounts during the initial phase irrespective of the ratings that they got. According to DIR: "Clearly, such approaches can give rise to perceived inequities and charges of unfair treatment following moderation that results in a lower performance bonus and rating." (1993a: 22) DIR conceded that during the initial stages of performance-based pay a number of agencies had struggled. Later, in order to avoid any further problems in implementation due to the lack of administrative resources, DIR ordered all the officers to be paid at similar levels irrespective of the levels that they achieved at least during the early stages until operational stability is effectively drafted into the systems.A memorandum was formulated by three agencies (Department of Finance, Public Service Commission and DIR) to weed out the problems that arose from the initial framework. They agreed that the change which was brought into the system was indeed complex and difficult to execute (Department of Industrial Relations, 1993b). They also found out that the number of people eligible for performance based pay was much higher (about 90%) which was too high a number and the agencies did not have a system in place to differentiate between performers and non performers. They also found that the 5 point scale that was suggested at first was not used across all departments, leading to dissatisfaction among many workers as they felt that they were not being judged on the same platform as that of others in the system.The memorandum tried to address most of the concerns that were pointed out in the initial phase and new guidelines were set up which aimed at reducing the complexities in the process later on (Stewart, 1996). Shortcomings in the moderation process were overcome by having a discussion between moderators and immediate supervisors before rating the employees. It also said that the initial scores were just a preliminary to give an idea where the employee actually stands and may change later on after the moderation process. The subjective nature of the rating process was another major flaw that was observed and in order to overcome this, it required solid quantitative measures to evaluate the employees.DIR suggested that the ratings should be spread out to make sufficient differentiation between the different levels so that the employees are motivated to work better to achieve better ratings. They said that it was the responsibility of the agency heads to ensure that there is visible difference between different bands and the method in which they would be analysed should be made known to the employees to avoid any ambiguity. Moreover, the number of people eligible was made less than 805, with less than 40% entitled to get 'high performance' rating. This was done in order to improve productivity by means of competition (Department of Industrial Relations, 1993a).4.0 绩效协议与绩效为基础的薪酬Performance Agreements and Performance Based PayPerformance appraisal was the factor that held the performance based pay system in the Australian Public Service. It was through performance appraisals that the corporate goals and communication goals within the organisation were tied to the pay structure. Training needs of senior officials were also identified by this process and gaps in the system were analysed. It was a method of deciding the performance appraisals and bonuses at the same time providing a stick to threaten the under performers. By making only 40% eligible for the highest rank, a sense of competition started taking place in the system. This was never seen before as the employees of the public services believed that they would be paid equally no matter how hard they work (Gomez-Mejia, 1990). Thus the system was able to change the mindset of the employees in the first place.#p#分页标题#e#Performance agreements were discussed between supervisors and officials before the appraisal cycle which was generally for a period of one year. The Performance Appraisal consisted of five stages:Corporate goals need to be tied up with the appraisal system. So the major job responsibilities of the official (which would help to analyse the employee) were identified and were discussed with the employee at the first stage.List of strategies that would be followed to achieve the corporate goals were identified and responsibilities were assigned accordingly.Quantitative measuring yard sticks were formed at the third stage so as to decide on the factors on which the employee would be analysed.The fourth stage took place after the cycle is over. This included rating the given employee based on the 5 point rating that was devised to grade them.Performance bonuses were given away to those who scored above three in the five point scale (3- Satisfactory, 4- Superior, 5- Outstanding).Before they introduced the agreements they trained the employees on various things such as how to negotiate during performance appraisals and how to identify measurable goals and incorporate it into the agreement. This was done with an aim of making the employees aware of the processes that were going to happen so that they would not be caught out by them (Wright, 1995).Still there were complaints from many quarters that the process was rushed into the system and many agencies still did not have resources to carry out the same. Many times, it was difficult to identify the quantitative factors based on which the appraisal took place, just because many process were interdepartmental in nature and it involved the work of many others in the process. All of which made individual ratings a difficult thing to make. This was especially found with officials working in policy areas. Even when the government adopted a particular policy, it was difficult to identify the individual contribution in the same. When all the officials were rewarded for the policy implementation, then the basic idea of having graded systems seemed to go a bit haywire (Stewart, 1996).5.0 绩效反馈Performance FeedbackPerformance feedback aims at getting quality feedback from the officials and thus, increases the levels of performance. Performance feedback should be given in such a way that the employees improve out of that. But generally this is one step that is often neglected and many organisations were just attempting to have token attempts at providing the feedback. Many managers dislike appraisals involving negative feedback and conveniently avoid that part. For this part to work both sides have to maintain a good relation with each other (Public Service Commission, 1995b). A 360 degree feedback would give a holistic picture about how an employee would fare in a particular position. By the introduction of performance based pay they encouraged a process of feedback which would not have occurred otherwise. Earlier, this process of feedback used to be limited with standard terminology and jargon which gave the participants only a brief overview of their performance. Midterm reviews never took place and reports were short and did not contain essential information with hardly any or no mention of the real discussion that actually took place. The review process was often expedited and was considered to be an unimportant task of filling up some official papers. It was found that many officials often took negative criticism personally and frequently confronted it, visible changes were also not seen in their performance. Due to this, many supervisors refused to give negative feedback and to point out deficiencies in the work of officials (Marsden and Richardson, 1994). They tended to either find constructive criticism hard to do or were not able to do it at all. In most of the cases when the problems started rising, supervisors simply transferred officers to another area of work. The Federal Government's best practices paper accepts the lack of quality in the feedback provided by supervisors compared to industry standards and mentioned it as a top priority thing to be resolved.6.0 绩效评估的等级和适度性Ratings and Moderation in Performance AssessmentEven though the employees were consulted before setting the targets based on which they would be rated, the onus for rating the employees lay in the management's hands. By this, the management exercises control over the performance of the workers by using their managerial prerogative to control the work. Performance-based pay, according to Kessler and Purcel (1992: 23) 'is unique among payment systems in stripping away those collective procedures and institutions which have obscured the essentially individualistic nature of the employment relationship. In so doing, the very mechanics of a PRP scheme provide opportunities for the greater exercise of managerial control.'One of the major drawbacks that were removed was that earlier supervisors exercised greater managerial control over the officials. Even though there were a set of guidelines based on which he (the typical supervisor) would work yet, it was under his control to decide whether a particular officer is above satisfactory or not. This led to the whole process being subjective. Many senior officials reported that they had little faith in the system as they did not know how these judgements were made and in case they feel they were in error, there was no system of redress to address the same. Many even developed a feeling that the supervisors were not capable enough to judge them. There was also this feeling that performance appraisals were made to be a platform wherein supervisors chose to victimise less preferred officers. Supervisors who were aware of such dangers started getting fewer objectives in terms of their ratings and as a result the whole process was a subjective affair (Wright, 1995). Earlier those who held senior positions or managed high profile departments were more likely to receive a fat package rather than a guy whose work is worthy enough and at the same time this did not feature in the main article of Canberra times. This was an amateurish approach that was followed by the departments which was removed as a result of the new performance for pay system that was implemented (Wright, 1995).7.0 不统一的规定Inconsistencies EverywhereEarlier ratings were found to be given in an inconsistent manner. On one hand many supervisors were generously rating their officers, but there were another group which rated all the managers with similar ratings. Then there were a third group who diligently followed the process and as a result many officers were rated below the average ratings as the average used to be on the higher end of the scale. Objectivity was lacking in the process and no one knew what it was all about and how they would be judged as even the reports spoke very little about the assessment criteria. It ultimately was on the supervisor whether he liked the officer or not and this lead to widespread dissatisfaction amongst the officers, and there were public protests against the same in many places (Wood, 1995).There was another problem brewing in the system as many supervisors started taking an easy option of marking the middle by giving everyone ratings above the midpoint (Wright, 1995). According to them this was done in order to avoid any damage to team cohesion or bonding. But what actually happened was that all the managers and officers got into a mindset that they would be rated above average no matter what they do. This resulted in an overwhelming majority receiving performance bonus when they actually did not deserve to receive them. In the 1993 payout more than 91% received performance bonus which added up to a cost of $35.8 million (Department of Finance, 1994: 4). However, later when the rules were revised a sense of competition set in which made the officers work hard for their bonuses. The change in the scenario is quite evident from the table below (Auditor-General, 1993:Â 12).8.0基于绩效的薪酬：对团队的激励？ Performance based Pay: Against Team Motivation?A performance based system is a sign of the employer's unwillingness to negotiate with the workers union. Initially even though CPSU was against the performance based system, it was ready to agree to the adoption of the system at a later stage, just because they wanted the employees in the public sector enjoying similar benefits as that of the private sector. After various problems started arising just when this new system was adopted, CPSU changed its stance and said that their support was conditional on the fact that they get a guarantee on the base payments (Public Sector Union, 1993). They were of the view that this new system was equally subjective as the previous one and that any change in the system would result in a reduction in morale and little gain in efficiency. The productivity pool concept was put forward by the government which was then agreed on by the union. Senior officials in most of the agencies were of the opinion that performance based pay should be folded back and the fund should be used for a common productivity pool which would make the system more equitable.With this development in many departments the performance based pay was cancelled and with it went the motivation for performance appraisal. As said earlier it has been seen that the process of performance appraisal was just a bureaucratic procedure and officials tried to simply finish off the paperwork just for the sake of it. After the initial experiments of the pay for performance, the "High Flyer" scheme with limited bonus payments came into force in the year 1996. According to this scheme only the top 25% were eligible in each department for bonuses. CPSU wanted a three point unmoderated scale to be implemented and they started protesting against the decision and decided to ban members who agreed to the five point scale system by November 1996 (Wood, 1995).#p#分页标题#e#9.0 激励与团队的绩效工资Motivation and Team Work by Pay for PerformanceCritics reject the assumption that motivation levels increase once their pay is linked to that of performance (Brindle, 1987). Many studies suggest that employees tend to perform satisfactorily rather than trying out new things out of the fear of receiving a lower rating. Here the important factor is how the organisation is trying to send out messages to its employees, if they try to send out wrong signals by increasing competition at an intense level which would result in a loss of team bonding.Many senior officials when interviewed were not interested in increases in pay. They were motivated by other factors, such as better working conditions and a more challenging job, etc. They were also offended by the fact that there is a public notion that these senior officials are ready to work harder when they are paid more. Considering Australian culture and studies conducted on it, the degree to which performance based pay would motivate the employees to work harder within the Australian Public Service is questionable (Ingraham, 1993).10.0 结论ConclusionIn this case study it is evident that performance based pay when introduced into the Australian Public Service in December 1992 did not result in massive changes in performance culture within the organisations (Wood, 1995). There were various questions that arose in the operations of the performance appraisal system itself, such as hesitation to provide negative feedback. This was especially high in cases where such feedback regarding work performances affected bonuses. Measurement and quantification was a big issue where most of the rating was subjective in nature and employees had lost faith in the system and started doubting the credentials of the supervisors who rated them. Another feature was that in many cases individual contributions were impossible to measure as many layers and departments were involved. In many cases complaints about people working in high profile departments getting higher pay were also seen here. So basically there were many operational flaws in the system of performance appraisal itself.When such a system was implemented in APS supervisors' managerial prerogatives increased and as a result of this favouritism and victimisation took place which made the working environment even more badly. Ratings were also given in an inconsistent manner as there was no fixed framework followed by the supervisors. The moderation process was viewed as unfair and undertaken by a senior management team that was unaware of the actual working conditions of the organisation. Studying the implementation of the APS system has demonstrated that performance based pay does not necessarily motivate employees in higher positions to work harder; instead they are motivated by other non monetary factors, such as job enrichment and better facilities at work. It was also found to be divisive in nature as team bondage and team work is totally affected and the team members develop a negative sense of competitiveness which does not build up a culture of mutual sharing and help in the organisation. Even though the system was divisive in nature it essentially showed that employees preferred to stay united when they voted strongly in favour of the productivity pool which would make the pay scales more equitable.