2022美国人代写英国留学生国际贸易专业essay论文定制： NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES:CHINA AND THE MUL
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES:CHINA AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
Robert Z. LawrenceWorking Paper 12759http://www.nber.org/papers/w12759指导英国论文NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138December 2006Prepared for a conference on "China and Emerging Asia: Reorganizing the Global Economy?" Organizedby The Korea Institute for Economic Policy (KIEP) and Center for International Commerce and Finance(CICF) at Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University to be held in Seoul,Korea, May 11 & 12 2006. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.© 2006 by Robert Z. Lawrence. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given tothe source.China and the Multilateral Trading SystemRobert Z. LawrenceNBER Working Paper No. 12759December 2006JEL No. F13ABSTRACTThis paper reviews China’s multilateral and preferential trade policies. It reviews the demanding termsof China’s WTO accession, its current tariff and trade regime and its participation in the Doha Roundnegotiations and the institution’s regular activities. The analysis concludes that China’s trade policiesare broadly supportive of a rules based multilateral trading order and its behavior at the WTO is thatof a status quo power rather than one seeking major systemic changes. The discussion then turns toChina’s regional trade initiatives. China has been extremely active in negotiating these and their implicationsremain uncertain. Concerns about an East Asian fortress, though, appear misplaced. Directly, and throughtheir impact in inducing others to respond, these FTAs could provide a powerful impetus to the processof competitive global liberalization. Countries that do implement agreements with China will findit relatively easy to open their markets to other developing countries. There is also a risk howeverthat the proliferation of FTAs will lead to web of overlapping agreements that could make the tradingsystem unnecessarily complexRobert Z. LawrenceJFK School of Government79 JFK StreetCambridge, MA 02138and [email protected] and the Multilateral Trading SystemFor more than two decades, China’s rapid growth has been driven by its global#p#分页标题#e#economic engagement. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, foreign trade and foreigndirect investment have made even more important contributions to Chinese growth.Between 2001 and 2005, for example, the dollar value of Chinese exports and importsincreased at annual rates of 29.3 and 25.3 percent respectively and in 2005, 58 percent ofChinese exports originated from foreign owned firm. As a result of this performance,China’s share in world imports increased from 3.3 in 2001 to 5.9 percent in 2004 and itsshare in world exports from 3.9 percent in 2001 to 6.5 percent in 2004. This makes Chinaa major participant in world trade and having now surpassed Japan, the dominant tradingpower in East Asia 1 China looms particularly large as an exporter of labor- intensivemanufactured goods and components and as a major importer of capital goods, primarycommodities and semi-finished parts. 2 It is also the developing world’s largest recipientof direct foreign investment.Given its size, the pace of its expansion, and its outward orientation, China islikely to have a growing impact on the global trading system and its policies are likely tohttp://www.ukassignment.org/ have an important influence on the system’s evolution. These policies have been asdynamic as its trade and investment performance. In 2001 after fourteen years ofnegotiations, China became a full member of the WTO, assuming obligations that are at1 In 2003 and 2004 china accounted for 10.6 and 8.9 of the growth in world imports and 10.5 and 9.7 ofworld exports.2 Having assumed the ranks of the world’s third largest trader, Chinese trade policies will now be subject tothe WTO Trade review mechanism every two years – a treatment reserved for countries with large tradevolumes.4the level of many developed economies. Since that time it has participated actively in theinstitution’s activities and negotiations. In part to meet the conditions of its accession,China has also dramatically liberalized its domestic economy and introduced a largenumber of internal policies that consolidate its transition to a market economy. Inaddition, China has adopted a multi-track trade policy strategy, complementing its WTOand domestic liberalization policies with regional trading initiatives. By 2005, China hadcompleted four FTA agreements (Thailand in 2003, Hong Kong and Macao in 2004 andChile in 2005) and as estimated by Wong and Hufbauer have proposed and/or launchednegotiations for least another fifteen.3What do these policies portend? When China proposed joining the WTO several#p#分页标题#e#concerns were raised. One was that the system as a whole could be weakened becauseChina was not a fully market driven economy and was therefore unlikely or unable toadhere to the WTO rules. China then acceded to the WTO under very demanding termsand there were fears that either deliberately or inadvertently it would not implement thesecommitments.4 This would put other members in the difficult position of either (a) tryingto compel compliance with trade retaliation and other sanctions that could increasefrictions or (b) ignoring Chinese infractions thereby undermining the WTO system inestablishing an international rule of law to which all members adhered.A second concern was that China would not participate constructively in theWTO. It would throw its weight around, try quickly to obtain disproportionate influence3 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Yee Wong, “Prospects for Regional Free Trade in Asia” Washington DC:Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Number WP-o5-12. October 2005. Their list ofproposed agreements includes APEC, East Asia, South-East Asia, Brazil, GCC, India, Mexico, NewZealand, Peru, Singapore, South Africa, Mercosur, Australia, Chile, Iceland, Japan, Korea and Pakistan.4 Glenda Mallon and John Whalley for example express concern about that Chinese policy instrumentswould generate many new trade disputes. See “China’s Post Accession WTO Stance” NBER WorkingPaper No. 10649 August 2004.5and use its influence to fundamentally change the WTO system. China was also seen as apotentially powerful addition to the ranks of developing countries, and many in thedeveloped world worried that it would seek to limit the obligations required ofdeveloping countries.More recently a third set of questions is being raised with respect to China’s tradepolicies in the East Asian region. Would Chinese regional initiatives undermine themultilateral trading order? Is China seeking to establish an East Asian trading bloc underits leadership that discriminates against outsiders? Will it use its market to create a huband spoke system in East Asia in which China gains serves as the hub and the othercountries are the spokes? Finally there is the fear that not only China but other countriesin the region are creating a system of overlapping trade regimes – or a noodle bowl – thatcould impose unnecessary trading costs, induce harmful trade diversion, and actuallyfragment rather than integrate the regional economy.This paper, considers these questions. Chinese policies are analyzed with a viewto determining the direction they are taking and the effects they are likely to have on the#p#分页标题#e#multilateral system. The discussion first considers China’s participation in the WTO. Itreviews the terms of accession, China’s current tariff and trade regime and itsparticipation in the Doha Round negotiations and the institution’s regular activities. Theanalysis concludes that China’s trade policies are broadly supportive of a rules basedmultilateral trading order. China has accepted and implemented obligations that go farfurther than most developing countries. It has been interested in using the system toadvance its interests rather than in changing it.5 Its behavior at the WTO is thus more5 See Margaret M. Pearson, China’s Multiple Personalities in Geneva: Constructing a Template for Futureresearch on Chinese Behavior in WTO” University of Maryland (mimeo) 2003.6akin to that of a status quo power than one seeking major systemic changes. Thediscussion then turns to China’s FTA initiatives. These are still a work in progress, andtheir implications are uncertain. Concerns about an East Asian fortress appear misplaced.Directly, and through their impact in inducing others to respond, these FTAs couldprovide a powerful impetus to the process of competitive global liberalization. Countriesthat do implement agreements with China will find it relatively easy to open their marketsto other developing countries. There is also a risk that the proliferation of FTAs will leadto web of overlapping agreements that could make the trading system unnecessarilycomplex.China’s policies both at home and abroad are still evolving and thus major shiftsin the direction and nature of the policies cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, the finalsection considers four factors that could play an important role in influencing outcomesin the future. These are the precise terms of the agreements that are concluded, China’sdomestic implementation of its commitments, the impact of currency appreciation onChina’s competitiveness and protectionist responses to China by other countries.Section I: China in the WTOThe WTO operates by consensus. Any country seeking to join mustessentially satisfy all existing members before they will permit it to accede. To be sure,formally, there is a requirement for decisions on accession to be approved by a vote oftwo thirds of the Members (Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, ArtXII.1) and there are also provisions allowing existing and acceding members a one timeopportunity to opt out from extending MFN provisions when countries accede(Agreement Establishing the WTO Art XIII) but in practice unanimity is sought and most
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7countries receive full MFN treatment. The need to obtain such approval means that newmembers are often asked to assume obligation that are far more extensive than existingmembers at an equivalent stage of economic development.Accession Commitments. The terms of China’s accession to the WTO exemplifythese propositions. Although China is a developing country and thus in principle entitledby the WTO’s “enabling clause” to special and differential treatment, the United Statesand other WTO members were successful in insisting that China enter the WTO on“commercial terms”. This meant that China assumed obligations that in many cases wentfar beyond those expected of existing members at its stage of development. Thesecommitments involved not simply reducing border barriers but undertaking detailedchanges in internal policies.Upon accession China was required to make major tariff reductions and by 2007to reduce average import-weighted average tariffs to 6.8 percent. 6This is a majoradditional decline in tariffs which had averaged 40.6 percent as recently as1992 and isalmost half the average level in place upon accession. Almost all China’s non-tariff tradebarriers have to be removed. Nearly all imports and export quotas and licenses had to beremoved by 2005 and those that did remain to be administered in a transparent manner.By 2005, all firms were to be allowed to import and export goods. China also agreed toimplement the WTO TRIMs agreement without exceptions and thus could no longermake the permission to invest or import contingent on performance requirements such asearning foreign exchange or using domestic content. Restrictions on foreign participationin the distribution sector were to be phased out within three years. China also agreed to6 Razeen Sally, “China’s Trade Policies and its Integration into the World Economy” Paper prepared forIGD/SAIIA SACU-China FTA Workshop, Johannesburg, 28-29th September 2004.8the TRIPs and it adopted the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements immediately upon itsaccession.There were also a host of commitments with respect to policy transparencyincluding obligations to translate into English and publish new laws and regulations andto establish inquiry points for foreign firms and governments. Time is be allowed forcomment before laws are promulgated and new tribunals established to reviewadministrative acts relating to WTO implementation with the right of appeal to higherjudicial bodies.Although the WTO is in principle based on non-discrimination China was alsocompelled to agree, on a transitory basis, to permit members to subject it to#p#分页标题#e#discriminatory treatment. First, it agreed to both a special selective safeguard that couldbe used against its exports for twelve years after its accession. It also agreed to anadditional safeguard provision for textiles and apparel that would be in force until the endof 2008 and could be (and has been) used temporarily to deny it the full benefits of theexpiration of the MFA in 2005; 7Second, China agreed to accept non-market economystatus for the purposes of anti-dumping rules until the end of 2015. This would allowcountries to use specially constructed prices in evaluated claims of dumping broughtagainst Chinese exporters; and third, China allowed the WTO setting up a transitionalReview Mechanism that would review its implementation record annually for the first tenyears of its membership.These demanding terms were useful for Chinese reformers. Before its accessionto the WTO, China’s initial domestic reforms involved taking tentative steps towards7 Par 242 of the report of the Working Party on the Accession of China”9introducing a market system to its economy. The enterprises that played a leading role inthese reforms, however, were generally owned by foreign investors and local Chinesegovernments rather than private Chinese entrepreneurs. WTO membership strengthenedthe hand of reformers seeking to hasten China’s movement towards a more developedmarket economy. The benefits from WTO accession became an added reason forundertaking the domestic reforms needed to join the organization. WTO entry hasallowed China’s leadership to make a more credible commitment towards moving Chinatowards a system that more fully recognizes private enterprise.The requirements of WTO entry forced Chinese policymakers to confrontpolitically difficult issues. These included reforming domestic banking institutions,subjecting state-owned enterprises to harder budget constraints, and allowing privatefirms to freely engage in international trade. WTO entry also mobilized domestic firmsto become more competitive through restructuring, acquiring new technologies, andforming new alliances and mergers with both domestic and foreign firms.The WTO accession process also served to promote better Chinese governance.The WTO requires policy transparency and the enforcement of domestic trade policies onthe basis of rules rather than bureaucratic discretion. WTO membership also necessitatesnon-discrimination (i.e. national treatment) for imported goods and services. Chinaremains a country with considerable domestic barriers and strong provincialgovernments. If provinces are forced to provide national treatment for imported goods#p#分页标题#e#and services, they will find it harder to discriminate against goods from other provinces.Many of these reforms are changes that China might have chosen to implement anyway,but entry into the WTO served to advance their implementation.10In 2004, as reported in Table 1 below, these requirements were apparent inChina’s tariff regime and WTO commitments. China had bound one hundred percent ofits tariffs—a discipline which most other Asian and many developing countries anddeveloped countries have not accepted. Unlike almost all developing countries that haveaverage bound rates far in excess of their applied rates, there is almost no water inChina’s tariffs. Its average applied rates in 2004 of 10.4 were converging closely to itsfinal bound rate average of 10 percent. China’s average applied rates on non-agriculturalproducts of 9.5 percent in 2004 were similar to those of Malaysia 9.1 and converging tothe levels of Korea and other East Asian economies of around 6 percent. They werealready far below the average non-agricultural rates applied by other major developingcountries such as Brazil 12.7, Egypt 19.5, India 27.9 and Mexico 17.1. China’s averageapplied tariffs on agricultural products of 16.2 percent are similar to those of thePhilippines and Chinese Taipei and far below those of Korea, Thailand, Egypt, India andMexico.China’s services liberalization is also very impressive. Commitments have beenmade for ninety three sectors, a number way above the typical developing country orASEAN member and quite in line with the commitments of Korea (98 sectors) and SouthAfrica (91 sectors.) Among noteworthy commitments: the banking sector is to becompletely open to foreign competition by the end of 2006. In telecommunications up to49 percent ownership is to be allowed by 2006. The Insurance sector was also extensivelyliberalized. Foreign securities houses were allowed minority equity and severalprofessional services, most notably legal were liberalized as well.11WTO Participation. Appraisals of China’s performance at the WTO are generallypositive.8 Its delegation is regarded as being of high quality. It has participated activelyin regular WTO activities. Remarkably, it has only been involved in one dispute as acomplainant (US steel safeguards) and two as a defendant. There was a case initiated bythe United States in March 2004 relating to preferential value added tax for domesticallydesigned integrated circuits9 and currently there is a case regarding auto parts in whichboth the US and the EU allege China has violated its commitments. In several other
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cases where China has been challenged they have quickly come into compliance.10 Chinahas also participated in 47 cases as a third party something which both the EU and US8 According to Pearson, “on a personal level, China’s interlocutors at the WTO, as at APEC, are uniformlycomplimentary about the quality of China’s delegation”.9 The case resulted in a mutually agreed solution in October 2005 China agreed to amend or revoke themeasures at issue.10 Author’s private communication with a US trade lawyer based in China.12routinely do to ensure that they have the right to defend their interests should the needarise. This participation is a clear demonstration that China views its interests as systemicand that these go beyond only those disputes in which it is directly involved.China has also been active in the Doha Round negotiations. Non-AgriculturalMarket Access (NAMA) is the area of greatest importance as an offensive objective.China would like to as much liberalization as possible by other countries while at thesame time insisting on special treatment for countries that have recently acceded. Chinahas engaged actively in NAMA discussions of formulas that should be employed fortariff reduction. In agriculture its positions are more mixed. It is very interested inreducing subsidies and protection in developed countries. It chose to participate in theG20 formed at Cancun in order to press these claims although it has not been particularlyactive in joining other groups. It would also like to see lower barriers to its agriculturalexports to developing countries. On the other hand, China also seeks some flexibility incommitments assumed by developing countries to assist poor farmers and promote ruraldevelopment. In the services area, China also has a particular interest in mode-fourliberalization the movement of natural persons. This would increase opportunities forChinese workers to work abroad . China is particularly concerned about rules. It seeksmore disciplines on anti-dumping practices such as zeroing for example. China has alsovoiced its support for trade facilitation although it is not particularly interested in suchassistance for itself. It has also not been a vociferous advocate of S&D treatment because13it clearly has an important interest in seeing developing countries with large markets suchas India and Brazil making meaningful liberalization commitments.11Overall, therefore, in the Round, China has not tried to take as a strong aleadership role as Brazil, but it has by no means been passive. This is also true of itsactivity at the WTO more generally. Hakan Nordstrom has undertaken a very interesting#p#分页标题#e#analysis of country participation in WTO activities. He has collected data on all writtensubmissions members have undertaken both individually and with others in 2003. Thesereflect activities undertaken both in the ruling bodies of the WTO as well as in the DohaRound negotiations. China emerges in these data as the most active developing countryand the third most active WTO member. Its total of 65 written submissions wasconsiderably below those for the EU (120 submissions) and the USA (116), but greaterIndia the second most active developing country participant. The detailed data reported inappendix Table1 indicate that China was especially active in the Rules Committee with18 submissions, ten of which related to subsidies and countervailing duties.Table 2. Top 10 WTO participants (written submissions, 2003)Rank Member Category Overall Individual Joint1 EC D 120 105 152 USA D 116 109 73 China DC 65 48 174 Japan D 61 44 175 Australia D 50 44 66 India DC 48 16 327 Switzerland D 46 23 238 Chile DC 45 16 299 Thailand DC 44 16 2810 Canada D 43 36 711 Pearson makes the interest point that China has not been a participant in coalitions of developingcountries that have resisted liberalization such as the “Like-minded Group” that focused on the difficultiesof developing country implementation (page 23)14Source: Nordström 12In most respects, therefore, China appears as a constructive member working topursue its interests which for the most part correspond to the organization’s goals ofgreater multilateral liberalization. There are however two matters in which China hasbeen more aggressive and even recalcitrant. Both reflect powerful domestic politicalconcerns. The first relates to Taiwan. Members of the WTO are officially customsterritories rather than sovereign nations. As such China could tolerate the accession ofTaiwan which also occurred at Doha. At the same time, however, the government ofChina has fiercely fought any gesture by WTO members that could imply that Taiwanenjoyed sovereign status. This has led to testy interactions when Taiwan attempted toexercise its rights to formal consultations. In 2003, there was also considerable friction inresponse to Chinese efforts to downgrade Taiwan status from “permanent mission” whichcould imply an independent country to office of permanent representative”13China has also been visibly unenthusiastic about the annual Transitional ReviewMechanism it is forced to undergo. China is required by the terms of accession agreementeach year to provide an extensive amount of data regarding its policies and performance#p#分页标题#e#and then to submit to questioning by other members. These reviews are a naggingreminder about the terms of its accession that some in China viewed as having been a sellout. They also appear to question China’s integrity and its willingness to honor its legallybinding commitments. China grudgingly sticks to the letter of law in meeting this12Håkan Nordström “ Participation of developing countries in the WTO – new evidence based on the 2003official records” National Board of Trade, Sweden (mimeo) 2005.13 Pearson op. cit. page 16.15commitment, giving only oral answers to questions that are often less than forthcoming.It is clearly an unwilling participant and does not take kindly to the treatement.All told therefore, China is seeking normalcy not special treatment and this issomething it will gain once the transitory arrangements associated with its accessionexpire. Within a decade, special safeguards, non-market status, and transitional reviewmechanisms will expire and China will gladly assume its role as a more normal but veryimportant WTO member.What accounts for the way in which China has participated in the WTO? Why hasit chosen to be constructive and yet not highly assertive? China is constructive becausethe WTO is a very attractive institution for China that clearly serves its interests. To besure, China was important enough to receive MFN treatment from almost all countrieseven prior to joining, and some suggested that by joining under such demanding terms, itwas opening itself up to challenges that could have actually reduced its market access.14But, for the most part such challenges have been conspicuous by their absence, andChina now enjoys unconditional MFN treatment and the ability to enforce its rightsthrough the dispute settlement system.China’s political relations with other countries are often problematic because ofthe undemocratic nature of its system of government and its poor record on human rights.This gives China a great interest in a strong, rules-based WTO because it allows its tradeand investment issues to be placed a less political, more technical track. In addition,since China does not have FTAs or benefit from preferences in its major developedcountry markets — the US, EU and Japan (so far) — the MFN terms on which access tothese markets is granted is especially important for China.14 See Mallon and Whalley op. cit.16Bargaining at the WTO is done on the basis of reciprocal concessions. This meansthat those with the largest markets exercise the greatest power. China’s large and growingmarket and its willingness and ability to liberalize position it naturally to exercise#p#分页标题#e#influence. But so far, it has been prudent it the way it has exercised this power. This isbecause China also seeks to be a leader of the developing countries and its economicinterest in liberalization and competitiveness in exporting come into conflict with thedesire of many developing countries to seek special and differential treatment and benefitfrom preferential access. This leads it to be less outspoken about its interests than it mightotherwise be and allows China to leave the demands for developing country liberalizationto the developed countries.Historically, times during which new powers are arising on the global stage havebeen filled with tension. And the real challenge for the rest of the world lies in ensuringthat an emergent China has incentives to engage the rest of the world in a cooperative andpeaceful fashion. China’s performance at the WTO suggests that at least so far, byallowing China to join, the rest of the world has helped meet this challenge.Section III: Regional Arrangements.Like almost every other WTO member, China has not confined its tradepolicy to the WTO. 15 Instead, it has both embraced and stimulated the current globaltrend towards Free Trade Agreements.16 China has concluded several agreements andis in the process of negotiating many more. In 2001, it began talks with ASEAN that15 Some countries, embarrassed by the need to explain why they are departing from a pure multilateralstrategy use the excuse of slow movement in the Doha Round as the reason why they are suddenlylaunching into a large number of FTAs but this is not generally very persuasive since some of the countriesmaking this excuse are among the least forthcoming. This is not, however, an argument made by theChinese government.16 For an excellent overview see Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley “China’s New Regional TradeArrangements” NBER Working Paper 10992 December 2004.17resulted in an agreement to eliminate tariffs and continue with a view to obtainingagreements with respect to investment and services. It 2003 an agreement inagriculture was concluded with Thailand. In 2004, Hong Kong & Macau signedagreements with the Mainland. In 2005, an agreement with Chile was concluded andthere are currently ongoing FTA negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,the Southern Africa Customs Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Otherdiscussions that are ongoing include Brazil, Iceland, India, Japan and South Korea. Inwhat follows, I first describe some of these agreements and then appraise theirsignificance.Asean. In 2002 a framework agreement on Comprehensive Economic#p#分页标题#e#Cooperation was signed with ASEAN to serve as guide for achieving an FTA thatcovers goods services and investment. The goal is to have an FTA in place by 2010among the more advanced of these countries. The newer ASEAN members (Vietnam,Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) will have until 2015 to comply. An early harvestprogram reduced or eliminated tariffs in about 10 percent of lines by 2006. Mostother tariffs are to be eliminated on between 2005 and 2010, by which time 90percent of tariff lines should be covered. The remaining 10 percent are deemedsensitive and will be removed at a slower pace. 17There are also ongoing negotiationswith respect to services and investment and expectations that ASEAN could obtainbenefits from acceleration in China’s WTO service liberalization commitments.181917 The sensitive groups of products would have their tariffs slashed starting in 2012 to reach a level betweenzero and 5 percent by 2020, while highly sensitive goods may maintain their import duties but only to amaximum 50 percent in 2020.18 Singapore government website.19 Investment Negotiations It has been agreed that the ASEAN Investment Agreement (AIA) would be usedas a template for investment negotiations.18China has heralded this agreement. Its press observes“The China-ASEAN FTA will form a huge market, with 1.85 billion consumers and acombined gross domestic product of almost US$2.5 trillion. The value of imports andexports of this zone will hopefully exceed that of the NAFTA (North America Free TradeAgreement) by 2010 and its GDP will likely be higher than that in the European Unionmarket. These three, China-ASEAN free trade zone, NAFTA and the EU, will becomethe three pillars of the world economy.”20China has also had talks on bilateral FTAs with some of the ASEAN countries. Inparticular it concluded the agreement with Thailand that focused on fruits and vegetablesin 2003. It also started talks with Singapore but these were suspended over a fallout onTaiwan.Hong Kong and Macao. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)Agreement signed by China and Hong Kong was the first completed FTA agreementsigned by both parties. Its stated purpose is “to strengthen trade and investmentcooperation by liberalizing tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantially all trade,liberalizing services and promoting trade and investment facilitation.” (CEPA Pre-Amble)The CEPA Agreement specifically makes clear that the parties will not apply theprovisions of China’s WTO accession that allow countries to (a) subject China to nonmarketeconomy status in the application of anti-dumping; and (b) impose special#p#分页标题#e#CooperationASEAN and China have also agreed to cooperation focusing on 5 priority sectors namely: agriculture, ICT,HRD, investment and the Mekong River Basin development, and 11 other activities including theacceleration of the Singapore-Kunming Railway Project20 These were the remarks by Wang Jinzhen, spokesman of China Council of Promotion of InternationalTrade (CCPIT), in Xiamen, Sept.7Remarks by Wang Jinzhen, spokesman of China Council of Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), inXiamen, Sept.719safeguards on all trade until 2012 and on textiles through 2008. 21 The schedules of theAgreement provide for the Mainland to eliminate duties on all products of Hong Kongorigin (except prohibited articles) provided that CEPA rules of origin are met. Both sidesalso eliminate the application of anti-dumping measures or countervailing measuresalthough they can apply safeguards. Services are liberalized using a positive list approachand in accordance with WTP practice extends the preferential treatment to “servicesuppliers of other WTO members that are engaged in substantive business operations.”Financial cooperation is given a lot of attention. The Mainland supports state-ownedbanks in relocating their treasure and foreign exchange trading centers to Hong Kong, inmaking acquisitions, using Hong Kong financial intermediaries, cooperative financialregulation, and the listing of insurance companies in Hong Kong. “The liberalizationpermits earlier access for Hong Kong service suppliers to the Mainland market, ahead ofChina’s World Trade Organization (WTO) timetable. In some sectors, like audiovisualservices, transport services and distribution services, the concessions go beyond China’sWTO commitments.” 22There are specific provisions for cooperation in financialservices (banking, securities and insurance) tourism, and trade and investmentfacilitation, and for encouraging the mutual recognition of professional qualifications andexchange of “professional talents”. “The two sides shall resolve any problem arising fromthe interpretation or implement of the “CEPA” through “consultation in the spirit offriendship and cooperation.” A Joint Steering Committee with officials designated by21 These are contained in Articles 15 and 16 of the “Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic ofChina to the WT0” and par 242 of the “Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China” China22Trade and Industry Department of Hong Kong Web Sitehttp://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/details/note.html#goods20
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both sides will make decisions by consensus. (Art 19:5) The Agreement signed withMacao follows a very similar template.Since Hong Kong did not apply tariffs on Chinese goods, for China thisagreement clearly was not about eliminating tariffs on its exports. It was given greatersecurity from anti-dumping and countervailing actions. However there are additionaladvantages. First, it signaled the special status of Hong Kong, second it gains relief fromthe discriminatory treatment in the WTO agreement. Third, it clearly used the agreementto signal government support for mainland financial institutions in Hong Kong. Inaddition it provides services firms in Hong Kong first foreign mover advantages.Indirectly, it also provides advantages for Hong Kong over Taiwan.Chile. In 2005 China and Chile concluded an FTA The two countries took lessthan a year to negotiate the accord, which immediately eliminates tariffs on 92% ofChile’s exports to China and 50% of the products that China sends to Chile. The pact doesnot cover services.23 In 10 years after the start of the tariff concession process, the importtariff of 97% of the tariff lines of both sides will be zero. Furthermore, the Agreementprovides that the two Parties may accelerate the tariff concession upon consensus throughconsultationNew Zealand hopes to become the first developed country to sign an FTA withChina. It has already become the first developed economy to grant it market economystatus. The FTA talks have gone on for several years. The New Zealand government,23 China-Chile FTA will start the comprehensive tariff concession in the latter half of 2006. At the Chileanside, the import tariff rates of 74% of the tariff lines will be lowered to zero immediately after theAgreement takes effect, while at the Chinese side, 63% of the import tariff lines will have zero rate within 2years; The remaining import tariff lines of both Parties, will be zero rated 5 to 10 years after the Agreementbecomes effective. Each party may keep only 3% of the tariff lines as exceptions with tariff ratesunchanged.21which was criticized for signing an agreement with Thailand that failed to includeservices, is insistent that the deal should be comprehensive and in addition to coveringcovers goods, services and investment, include provisions for rules of origin, traderemedies, intellectual property and government procurement.Australia. China is also involved in FTA talks with Australia. Again thememorandum of understanding that launched the talks granted China market economystatus. The Australian Government has also made clear that it is seeking a comprehensiveagreement that applies to “substantially” all goods, trade in services “as well as other#p#分页标题#e#non-tariff issues such as the recognition of standards, customs cooperation, protection ofintellectual property rights and regulation of foreign investment.” 24 25 Australia is ahighly competitive producer of agricultural and mineral products. In 2005, it accountedfor 98 percent of all Chinese beef imports, 12 percent of dairy imports, and significantamounts of cotton and wool. There are significant exports of barely, wheat, hides andskins and wine and very substantial quantities of iron ore, uranium, non-ferrous metals.Given Chinese tariffs on agricultural products of 15.3 percent and on Australianmanufactured goods of up to 45 percent, the amount of liberalization for China could besubstantial.26 On Australia’s part, the quid pro quo would be liberalization of tariffs on24 Australia-China Free Trade Agreement, Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade, March 2006.25 The Government also stresses “we will not be rushed. The Australian Government has stressed that anyFTA with China must deliver real gains for Australian businesses across the board. That is, it must becomprehensive – covering goods, services and investment –and be completed as a single undertaking.”Ibid.26 In a model done for the Australian government the authors assume Chinese barriers inagriculture have the following tariff equivalents: Wool 15 percent, Sugar 25 percent, OilSeeds 13percent, Cereals 3 percent, Wheat 30 percent, processed rice 10.6 percent. Source: Philip ADAMSMingtai FAN Ronglin LI and Zhaoyang ZHENG An Independent Report Prepared for: TheAustralia-China FTA Feasibility Study The Centre of Policy Studies Monash University 2 March200522labor intensive manufactured goods. In the textiles and clothing sector, Australianaverage tariffs are 9.1 percent and there are 234 tariff lines with rates of between 16 and20 percent, and 387 between 6 and 10 percent; in footwear there are 4 lines between 16and 20 percent and average rate of protection of 5.6 percent. 27The fact that China is willing to conclude FTAs with these two developedcountries that are highly competitive agricultural producers is very significant since itindicates a willingness to contemplate major adjustments in agriculture while alsoindicating these countries willingness to contemplate free trade in labor-intensivemanufacturing.Others. China has also launched talks with India and Pakistan. New Delhi doesnot quite share the enthusiasm for a conventional FTA although it is willing to talkabout cooperation. But Pakistan and China have signed a framework agreement,implemented an early harvest and Pakistan has provided China with the requisite#p#分页标题#e#market economy status. China is also discussing FTAs with many other potentialpartners in Latin America (Brazil, Peru), South Africa, the Gulf (GCC), Iceland, Asia(Korea) and with regional groupings such as APEC and East Asia (Asean plus three),Implications.China has numerous goals in signing these agreements. One immediate concernis to use them to obtain market status recognition and relief from being subject tospecial safeguards. — Ironically China is using these discriminatory agreements as away to remove the discrimination to which it has been subjected at the WTO. Asecond motive is to secure access to important raw materials— many of the countries27source: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/feasibility_3.pdf23are major suppliers of minerals (Chile-copper, Australia — iron-ore and uranium, andGCC—oil). A third is to solidify its relations and influence both inside and beyondthe East Asian region and a fourth, the most basic, is to gain improved market accessfor its exports which as labor –intensive manufactured and agricultural goods areoften subject to high tariff protection. Individual agreements are also used to achievespecific goals. For example, the Hong Kong and Macao agreements help underscorethe privileged relationship between the Mainland and these economies and ensure thatdespite their differences measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing dutiescould not be used to segment them. In addition these agreements were used toimplement specific joint initiatives and signal clearly that Beijing would permitincreased state owned banks to move some of their operations to Hong Kong.China is well aware of concerns that it is trying to dominate East Asia and/orclose it to outsiders, and it has gone to great pains to allay such fears. It is particularlyreluctant to appear domineering in its interactions with Asean and it prefers thatASEAN take the leading role in the bilateral relationship. China also does not wantto be seen as building a fortress Asia. Consider this official statement:“We should continue to support ASEAN in playing the leading role in East Asiacooperation. On the other hand, we should give due consideration to the legitimateinterests of the non-East Asian countries in this region, so as to gain theirunderstanding of and support for East Asia cooperation.”28In general, China’s approach to FTAs has been very pragmatic. It has shown awillingness to negotiate with countries individually and in groups (e.g. Asean and28 “Be Open and Inclusive And Achieve Mutual Benefit and Common Progress” Statement byPremier Wen Jiabao at The First East Asia Summit Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 14 December#p#分页标题#e#2005http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wjbfw/t228275.htm24Asean+Korea+Japan) with developed (new Zealand and Australia) and developingcountries and with those that are heavily specialized in agriculture (New Zealand andAustralia), manufactured goods (Asean, South Korea) and services (Hong Kong). Ithas been focused on East Asia but also quite willing to deal with countries in LatinAmerica, South Asia, and Africa. It has sought to signal that its interests are global.The agreements have not followed a single template. Some have includedgoods, services, investment and cooperation (e.g. Hong Kong, Macao), others coveronly goods (e.g. Chile), while some have started with goods liberalization with theintention to add services and investment later. (e.g. Asean). Several have beenlaunched with an early harvest in which some liberalization has come into effect assoon as talks have commenced. The deepest agreements thus far are with Hong Kongand Macao, although even these do not cover issues that are part and parcel ofagreements that are typically signed by the US (e.g. intellectual property, labor andenvironment, government procurement, dispute settlement by panels) or the EU (e.g.competition policy).Stumbling blocs? These Chinese initiatives raise several concerns that aretraditionally mentioned in debates about regional trade arrangements. The first is theconcern that these regional arrangements are likely to undermine the multilateral tradingsystem. This fear is misplaced. If (and this is an important qualification) they do achieveliberalization in “substantially all trade” FTA agreements that involve China are likely tohasten global liberalization. China has not insisted on covering services and investmentin its agreements, but its agreements do include liberalization in most merchandiseproducts Since China is such a competitive supplier of labor intensive manufactures, for25most countries, an FTA signed with China is very likely to be trade-creating on theimport side. Indeed, any country that adjusts domestically to Chinese competition is mostlikely to require little additional adjustment before it opens up to developing countries asa whole. (The same would be true of countries opening up in services mode four –themovement of natural persons if this is included in agreements.) If China is able to signFTAs with the Asian Pacific region, this region will be readily positioned to extend thisliberalization to the rest of world.A similar argument holds for those signing FTAs with the US with respect toservices and investment. The US has insisted on deep agreements that cover services with#p#分页标题#e#a negative list and investment in addition to trade in goods including agriculture. Anycountry that signs with both China and the US could surely extend these benefits to therest of the world without major additional dislocation.The dominoes appear to falling. Each time China concludes an FTA with anothersignificant trading partner, it puts pressure on others to preserve their access to theworld’s most rapidly growing market. In numerous sectors, China’s MFN tariffs remainsignificant and thus FTAs could give producers of those products a significantcompetitive advantage. Likewise, each time China succeeds in obtaining preferentialaccess to another market it adds to the pressure for others who sell in that market toobtain similar access. Korea and Japan for example, reacted to the agreement betweenChina and Asean by proposing FTAs of their own with Asean – something they probablywould not have done before.2929 The Korea International Trade Association (KITA) said the China-ASEAN FTA, which will come intoforce Wednesday, is expected to create the world’s largest economic bloc, with bilateral trade amounting toUS$1.2 trillion.26The FTA between Korea and ASEAN is still being finalized. It is expected to beimplemented this year and remove duties on 80 per cent of goods traded by 2009. Koreaand ASEAN have also pledged to conclude negotiations on liberalization in services andinvestment by the end of this year. Korea also has FTAs with Chile and Singapore and isseeking similar deals with several Latin American and other countries.Currently, Japan is reported to be in the process of developing a concertedresponse to the pressures it is feeling from the Chinese and US initiatives. It is developingnew policies with respect to agriculture and the movement of labor and planning a host ofadditional agreements to preserve its competitive position. 30 It appears that powerfulforces of competitive liberalization are operating effectively.Fortress Asia? A second, related concern is that East Asia could become a“fortress” in which barriers are raised or at least not lowered with respect to the rest ofthe world. China is, however, clearly willing to negotiate with countries outside theregion. Indeed this is true of the rest of Asia as well. The countries in the Asia Pacific areglobal traders and there is no evidence that they are confining their FTAs to the region.Instead, they are actively scouring the globe to find FTA partners. Singapore has FTAswith the US and a host of countries outside the region. 31Likewise Thailand, Malaysia andThe pact will cause disadvantages such as high tariffs for South Korean industries such as petrochemicals,#p#分页标题#e#textiles, shoes and electrical and electronic products, the KITA said.More than 21 per cent of South Korean exports to China will be subject to tariffs over 10 percentage pointshttp://www.ukassignment.org/ higher than those for China-bound ASEAN shipments in 2010, when the FTA is fully implemented, theKITA said. The FTA will impose no duties on more than 90 per cent of the trade between China andASEAN members by that time.30 Japan has reached Agreements for Economic Partnership Arrangements with Philippines, Malaysia andThailand. It is negotiating with Korea, Asean, Indonesia, and engaged in collaborative research with Chile,India, Australia, Switzerland. And in talks in Asean plus 3.31 Singapore’s government webpage lists eleven FTAs that are in place and fifteen more under negotiation.http://app.fta.gov.sg/asp/index.asp27South Korea are all negotiating with the United States 32and Japan has an FTA withMexico.Hub and spoke? A third concern is that China is going to erect a hub and spokesystem in which China has access to the regional economy duty free, but the othercountries do not have similar access to one another. But in fact, almost all countries in theregion are now negotiating with each other. For example, Asean is negotiating with bothSouth Korea and Japan and Australia with many countries in the region. So this fear isalso misplaced.Noodle bowl? The one concern that is legitimate is the fact that these FTAs arecreating a system of overlapping agreements with respect to rules of origin and otherprovisions that are unnecessarily cumbersome. By proceeding piecemeal in thesenegotiations, there is the danger for China and its other trading partners, that trade couldbe enveloped in the proverbial noodle bowl of agreements. Producers could have to meetdifferent standards and rules of origin when selling to different partners. This is an areain which the WTO and APEC have both seriously failed. In particular Article XXIV 5(b)of the GATT only states that the “duties and other regulations of commerce” once theFTA is concluded shall not be higher or more restrictive than they were before. But itdoes little to discipline the crafting of these to meet specific circumstances in a mannerthat is protectionist and inefficient. The simplest solution would be a single system ofrules that would be applied by all WTO members in all preferential agreements.Section III. Qualifications.32 Thailand’s negotiations with the US have confronted problems with respect to light trucks as well as
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agriculture and have become a domestic political issue.28I have argued that thus far, China has promoted trade liberalization in both theWTO and through its FTAs. However, it should be stressed that many of the FTAs haveyet to be completed and thus China’s trade and domestic policies remain very much awork in progress. In this final section, therefore I make four major qualifications to thisconclusion.Agreement details. First, the history of free trade agreements is a very mixed oneand in thinking about their implications it is important to pay attention both to theircontent and their prospects for implementation. Countries enter into FTAs with verydifferent motives. Some are genuinely interested in promoting trade liberalization anddeep economic integration and view the agreements as a complement to multilateralliberalization. For the most part, for example, the United States is using FTAs as part ofsuch an offensive strategy.33A second group of typically smaller countries is driven bythe desire to improve their competitiveness as a location for production. It is often saidthat preferential trade arrangements are “second best” and that multilateral liberalizationis first best. But for individual countries even better than free trade could be thecombination of no barriers at home and preferential access to all foreign markets. Thiscompetitiveness motive seems to explain why Chile and Singapore have pursued theseagreements so avidly. A third group of countries, however, are as yet unwilling toliberalize fully and are basically driven by defensive considerations to undertake theseagreements. For these countries, there is often a temptation to conclude agreements thatgo by the name of FTAs but (a) take a long time to implement; (b) exclude significantamounts of potential trade in goods and services (c) have highly restrictive rules of33 To be sure there is resistance in the US particularly from sugar and clothing producers.29origin that limit their impacts and (d) fail top include adequate provisions forenforcement.China basically seeks to use FTAs fundamentally to secure market access i.e. foroffensive purposes and it is prepared to open its market at home to do this. But itsinitiatives are also being driven by political considerations and the desire to reassureother countries. Unlike the US or the EU, China does not seem to have developed ademanding comprehensive FTA template that is used with minor changes with all itsFTA partners. Instead China has proceeded more opportunistically, signing agreementswith quite different degrees of depth and coverage. In part this is because China is using#p#分页标题#e#FTAs as much as an instrument of foreign policy as an instrument of trade policy.34 Thismeans that where China’s partner is willing to contemplate full liberalization in thecontext of a deep integration agreement, the result could be trade creation on a largescale. Indeed that would appear to be the implication of the types of agreements beingaimed at by the Australian and New Zealand governments. In negotiations with countriesthat fall into the defensive category, however, some of the agreements that are actuallyconcluded could be quite limited and there may be less there than meets the eye.Chinese implementation. A second key issue relates to the institutional capacity toensure that the agreements China signs are actually implemented at home. This holdswith respect both to China’s WTO and FTA commitments. The United States TradeRepresentative for example publishes an annual report on Chinese WTO compliance andit is filled with complaints of compliance failures. The most recent report for example is34 The greater flexibility in these agreements may reflect domestic decision-making differences. In the caseof the US, agreements must get through the congress.30101 pages long. 35 It is particularly concerned with the still incomplete transition from astate-planned economy. Other concerns include: the lack of enforcement of intellectualproperty laws, the continued use of industrial policies in sectors such as auto-parts, steel,and high-tech, regulatory intervention to support domestic enterprises, export restrictionson coke, the use of standards to favor domestic high tech producers and sanitary andphyto-sanitary standards to favor domestic farmers. Nonetheless, the USTR report doesacknowledge that China has made great strides towards coming into compliance and it issurely the case that trade agreements make it more likely that these issues can beresolved.Loss of competitiveness. A third key qualification relates to the continuation ofChina’s competitiveness and its impact on Chinese domestic politics. It seems clear thatthe competitiveness of its traded goods sector has clearly facilitated China’s adjustmentto its WTO accession and contributed significantly to the character of the trade policythat I have described in this paper. China is basically eager to erect a legal and politicalsuperstructure to ensure its access to key inputs and markets and it is prepared to exposeits domestic firms and farmers to increased foreign competition in order to do so.Nonetheless, even with the success it has enjoyed in recent years, domestic tensions havearisen with respect to the dislocation caused by the spread of the market economy.#p#分页标题#e#There is a widespread view that the Chinese currency is seriously undervaluedand there are strong external political pressures for a substantial appreciation. 36 The35 United States Trade Representative, 2005 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.GPOWashington DC: 2005.36 See “Clash of Titans” by C. Fred Bergsten. Newsweek, International Edition April 24 2006. MorrisGoldstein, “Reminbi Controversies” Paper prepared for the Conference on Monetary Institutions andEconomic Development Cato Institute November 3, 2005 and Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy,“What kind of Landing for the Chinese Economy? Policy Briefs in International Economics NumberPB04.7 Institute for International economics November 2004.31verdict of overvaluation seems supported by China’s very large current account surplusof about 5 percent of GDP in 2005 and its significant accumulation of foreign exchangereserves over the past few years. In March 2006, these amounted to $853.7 billionsurpassing the reserves held by Japan and making Chinese holdings the world’s largest.There is considerable debate over the appropriate course of action to deal with this issue,and a discussion here is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for out purposes itshould be recognized that if a significant appreciation of the reminbi was to undermineChinese competitiveness, the broad thrust of the policies described here could beadversely affected. Domestic protectionist pressures would surely increase and Chinawould be considerably less eager to pursue reciprocal free trade agreements if it was lessconfident in its ability to compete. Whatever the costs of China’s exchange rate policiesmight have been, therefore, the liberal nature of its recent trade policies should becounted among its benefits.Hyper-competivenss. On the other hand, there could be problems abroad, if Chinabecomes too competitive and protectionism abroad could offset Chinese liberalization athome. It could also undermine the application of MFN treatment. In both the UnitedStates and the European Union for example, the very large bilateral trade deficits withChina have heightened trade frictions. The surge in Chinese clothing exports in 2005when the Multi-fiber Agreement expired, led to the use of special safeguards in botheconomies. While these were legal, they are certainly discriminatory.In many developing countries, the highest non-agricultural tariffs are placed onprecisely the labor-intensive products in which China specializes. So while China’s tradepolicies are a force for a more liberal trading order, China’s trade performance exerts#p#分页标题#e#32countervailing pressures in other countries. Some may rise to the challenge, but otherscould become even more reticent to embrace global engagement.33Table A1: Distribution of submissions over areas and issues (2003) China WTOSeries WTO body DDA Ind. Joint Total Individual48 17 65Ruling BodiesWT/MIN(03)/ Ministerial Conference, Doha X 1 4 5WT/GC/ General Council 1 5 6TN/C/ Trade Negotiations Committee X 1 1 2AgricultureG/AG/ Committee on Agriculture 2 2TN/AG/ Committee on Agriculture – Special Session X 1 1G/SPS/ Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 3 3Non-Agriculture Market Access (NAMA)G/C/ Council for Trade in Goods (except trade facilitation) 1 1TN/MA/ Negotiating Group on Market Access X 1 1G/MA/ Committee on Market Access 1 1G/RO/ Committee on Rules of OriginG/VAL/ Committee on Customs Valuation 1 1G/LIC/ Committee on Import Licensing 1 1G/IT/ Committee of Participation on the Expansion of Trade in IT prod.G/TBT/ Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 3 3G/TRIMS/ Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures 1 1G/STR/ Working Party on State Trading EnterprisesRulesTN/RL/ Negotiating Group on Rules X 4 2 6G/ADP/ Committee on Anti-Dumping PracticesG/ADP/AHG/ Committee on anti-Dumping Practices – WG on ImplementationG/SCM/ Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 10 10G/SG/ Committee on Safeguards 2 2WT/REG/ Committee on Regional Trade AgreementsGATSS/C/ Council for Trade in Services 2 2TN/S/ Council for Trade in Services – Special Session X 1 3 4S/CSC/ Committee on Specific CommitmentsS/FIN/ Committee on Trade in Financial ServicesS/WPDR/ Working Party on Domestic RegulationS/WPGR/ Working Party on GATS RulesTRIPSIP/ Council for TRIPS 3 3TN/IP/ Council for TRIPS – Special Session XSingapore IssuesWT/WGTI/ WG on Relationship between Trade and Investment X 2 2WT/WGTGP/ WG on Transparency in Government Procurement XWT/WGTCP/ WG on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy X 2 2G/C/ Trade facilitation (dedicated meetings of the General Council) XDevelopment34WT/COMTD/ Committee on Trade and DevelopmentTN/CTD/ Committee on Trade and Development – Special Session X指导英国ESSAYWT/BOP/ Committee on Balance-of-Payments RestrictionsWT/WGTTT/ Working Group on Trade and Transfer of TechnologyWT/TDF/ Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance#p#分页标题#e#Trade and environmentWT/CTE/ Committee on Trade and EnvironmentTN/TE/ Committee on Trade and Environment – Special Sessions X 2 2TN/DS/ DSU Review 4 4Source: Nordstrom.35
