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留学作业网专业提供指导美国留学生社会心理学essay,指导美国assignment。Emotion Regulation in Adulthood: Timing Is EverythingAuthor(s): James J. GrossSource: Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Dec., 2001), pp. 214-219Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Association for Psychological ScienceStable URL: Accessed: 27/12/2009 10:49

AbstractTwo recent theories withinevolutionary psychology haveproduced novel insights intoconflict between the sexes. According to error management theory (EMT), asymmetries overevolutionary time in the costbenefit consequences of specificsocial inferences have produced predictable cognitive biases. Women, for example,appear to underinfer commitment in response to signals ofresource display. Men oftenoverinfer a woman’s sexual desire when she merely smiles ator casually touches them. Theseinferential biases, according toEMT, represent functional adaptations rather than markersof irrationality in informationprocessing. According to strategic interference theory, certain"negative emotions" functionto motivate action to reduceconflict produced by impediments to preferred social strategies. Emotions such asjealousy and anger, rather thanreducing rationality, may embody inherited ancestral wisdom functional in dealing withinterference inflicted by otherindividuals. These evolutionbased theories have producednovel empirical discoveriesand challenge traditional theories anchored in the premisethat cognitive biases and negative emotions necessarily leadto irrationality.留学作业网专业提供指导美国留学生社会心理学essay,指导美国assignment。Keywordsconflict; cognitive bias; negativeemotions; sex differences; sexuality; evolutionary psychologyIn mating and sexuality morethan in any other domain, womenand men have confronted differentCopyright ? 2001 American Psychological SocietyYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available atJSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained atEach copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed#p#分页标题#e#page of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact Association for Psychological Science and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Current Directions in Psychological Science.214 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001pie unidimensional ratings of pleasure or pain. People can experiencepain from sadness, anger, fear, anddisappointment. No one would argue that these emotions should betreated as equivalent. Furthermore,some decision outcomes simultaneously give rise to pleasure andpain. In those cases, people feel ambivalence. Finally, what about theduration of emotional experiences?When is regret a fleeting incident,and when does it last a lifetime? Answers to these questions will deepensocial scientists’ understanding ofemotions, and lead to better tools forguiding choice.Recommended ReadingGilbert, D.T., & Wilson, T.D. (2000).Miswanting: Some problems in theforecasting of future affective states.In J. Forgas (Ed.), Thinking and feeling: The role of affect in social cognition(pp. 178-197). Cambridge, England:Cambridge University Press.Kahneman, D., & Varey, C. (1991).Notes on the psychology of utility. In J. Elster & J. Roemer (Eds.),Interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing (pp. 127-163). New York:Cambridge University Press.Landman, J. (1993). Regret: The persistence of the possible. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Acknowledgments?Support was provided by the National Science Foundation(SBR-94-09819 and SBR-96-15993). Wethank Philip Tetlock for comments on anearlier draft.Notes1. Address correspondence to Barbara A. Meilers, Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University,Columbus, OH 43210; e-mail:[email protected]; or send e-mail to A.Peter McGraw [email protected]. Pleasure can be derived from actsof virtue, the senses, or relief frompain. Similarly, displeasurecan arisefrom anaggressive impulse,a sense ofinjustice, or frustration from fallingshort of a goal. Thus, choices based onpleasure need not imply hedonism.ReferencesBell, D.E. (1982). Regret in decision making underuncertainty. Operations Research, 30,961-981.Bell, D.E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 33,1-27.Gilbert, D.T., Pinel, E.C., Wilson, T.C., Blumberg,S.J., & Wheatley, T.P. (1998). Immune neglect:A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol#p#分页标题#e#ogy, 75,617-638.Kahneman, D. (2000). Evaluation by moments:Past and future. In D. Kahneman & A. Tversky(Eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 693-708).New York: Cambridge University Press.Loewenstein, G., & Schkade, D. (1999). Wouldn’tbe nice? Predicting future feelings. In D.Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.),Well-being: The foundations ofhedonic psychology (pp. 85-108). New York: Russell SageFoundation.Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory:An alternative of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92,805-824.Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1986). Disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies,53, 271-282.Meilers, B.A. (2000). Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences. Psychological Bulletin.Meilers, B.A., & McGraw, A.P. (2001). Predictingchoices from anticipated emotions. Unpublishedmanuscript, Ohio State University, Columbus.Meilers, B.A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I.(1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional reactions to the outcomes of risky options. Psychological Science, 8,423-429.Meilers, B.A., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999).Emotion-based choice. Journal of ExperimentalPsychology: General, 128,332-345.Savage, L.J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. NewYork: Wiley.Schkade, D.A., & Kahneman, D. (1998). Does living in California make people happy? Psychological Science, 9,340-346.Emotion Regulation in Adulthood:Timing Is EverythingJames J. Gross1Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CaliforniaAbstractEmotions seem to come andgo as they please. However, weactually hold considerable swayover our emotions: We influencewhich emotions we have andhow we experience and expressthese emotions. The processmodel of emotion regulation described here suggests that howweregulateour emotions matters. Regulatory strategies thatact early in the emotion-generative process should have quitedifferent outcomes thanstrategies that act later. This review focuses on two widely usedstrategies for down-regulatingemotion. The first, reappraisal,comes early in the emotion-generative process. It consists ofchanging how we think about asituation in order to decrease itsemotional impact. Thesecond,suppression, comes later in theemotion-generative process. Itinvolves inhibiting the outwardsigns of emotion. Theory and rejsearchsuggest that reappraisalis more effective than suppression. Reappraisal decreases theexperience and behavioral expression of emotion, and has noimpact on memory. By contrast,suppression decreases behavioral expression, but fails to decrease the experience ofemotion, and actually impairsmemory. Suppression also increases physiological responding in both the suppressors andtheir social partners.Keywordsemotion; mood; regulationSome goon in asportscar careens across your lane. You brakehard. You feel like yelling, throwPublished by Blackwell Publishers Inc.#p#分页标题#e#CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 215ing something, or even rammingthat idiot. Do you? Probably not.Instead, you regulate youremotions, and do something else thatyou think is more appropriate. Psychological research on emotionregulation examines the strategieswe use to influence which emotions we have and how we experience and express these emotions.This research grows out of two earlier traditions, the psychoanalytictradition and the stress and copingtradition (Gross, 1999b).2 In this review, I describe a process model ofemotion regulation that distinguishes two major kinds of emotion regulation. I illustrate each byfocusing on two common forms ofemotion down-regulation?reappraisal and suppression?anddemonstrate how these two regulation strategies differ in their affective, cognitive,and social consequences.A PROCESS MODEL OFEMOTION REGULATIONEmotion regulation includes allof the conscious and nonconsciousstrategieswe use to increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an emotional response(Gross, 1999a). These componentsare the feelings, behaviors, andphysiological responses that makeup the emotion.A moment’s reflection suggeststhere are many ways to go aboutregulating emotions. How can wemake sense of the potentially limitless number of emotion-regulationstrategies? According to my process model of emotion regulation(Gross, 1998b), specific strategiescan be differentiated along thetimeline of the unfolding emotional response. That is, strategiesdiffer in when they have their primary impact on the emotion-generative process, as shown in Figure 1.At the broadest level, we can distinguish between antecedent-focusedand response-focused emotionregulation strategies. Antecedent-focused strategies refer to thingswe do before response tendencieshave become fully activated andhave changed our behavior andphysiological responses. An example of antecedent-focused regulationis viewing an admissions interviewat a school you have applied to as anopportunity to see how much youlike the school, rather than a test ofyour worth. Response-focusedstrategies refer to things we doonce an emotion is already underway, after response tendencieshave been generated. An exampleof response-focused regulation iskeeping a poker face while holdinga great hand during an excitingcard game.Situations AspectsSIS2SlzSituationSelectionSituationModificationAttentionalDeploymentAntecedent-focusedEmotion RegulationMeanings Responsesr ml- m2-* m3EmotionResponseTendenciesExperiential+BehavioralPhysiologicalCognitiveChangeResponseModulationReappraisal SuppressionResponse-focusedEmotion RegulationFig. 1. A process model of emotion regulation. According to this model, emotion may be regulatedat five points in the emotion#p#分页标题#e#generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cognitions, and (e) modulation of experiential, behavioral, orphysiological responses. The first four of these processes are antecedentfocused, and the fifth is response-focused. The number of response options shown at each of these five points in the illustration isarbitrary, and the heavy lines indicate the particular options selected in the example given in the text. Two specific emotion-regulation strategies?reappraisal and suppression?are the primary focus of this review (Gross, 1998b).Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society216 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001As shown in Figure 1, five more Ispecific emotion-regulation strategies can be located within thisbroad scheme. The first is situationselection, illustrated in Figure 1 bythe solid arrow pointing towardSituation 1 (SI) rather than Situation 2 (S2). For example, you maydecide to have dinner with a friendwho always makes you laugh thenight before a big exam (SI), ratherthan going to the last-minute studysession with other nervous students (S2).Once selected, a situation maybe tailored so as to modify its emotional impact (e.g., Six, Sly, andSlz in Fig. 1). This constitutes situation modification. For example, atdinner, if your friend asks whetheryou are ready for the exam, youcan make it clear that you wouldrather talk about something else.Third, situations have differentaspects (e.g., al-a5 in Fig. 1), andattentional deployment is used to select which aspect of the situationyou focus on. An example is distracting yourself from a conversation that has taken an upsettingturn by counting ceiling tiles.Once you have focused on a particular aspect of the situation, cognitive change refers to selectingwhich of the many possible meanings (e.g., ml-m3 in Fig. 1) you willattach to that aspect. For example,if your upcoming test is mentionedduring the dinner conversation,you might remind yourself that"it’s only a test/’ rather than seeingthe exam as a measure of yourvalue as a human being. The personal meaning you assign to thesituation is crucial because it determines which experiential, behavioral, and physiological responsetendencies will be generated.Finally, response modulation refers to attempts to influence theseresponse tendencies once theyhave been elicited, illustrated inFigure 1 by the solid arrow pointing toward decreasing expressivebehavior. In our example, response Imodulation might take the form ofhiding your embarrassment afterbombing the exam. It might alsotake the form of altering experiential or physiological components ofemotion.CONTRASTING TWOFORMS OF EMOTIONREGULATION: REAPPRAISALAND SUPPRESSIONAntecedent-focused strategieschange the emotion trajectory veryearlyon.By contrast, responsefocused strategies occur after response tendencies have alreadybeen generated. This difference intiming predicts rather differentconsequences for these two kindsof emotion regulation. To test thisidea, my colleagues and I have focused on two specific strategies usedto down-regulate emotion. One is reappraisal. As shown in Figure 1, thisis a type of cognitive change, andthus antecedent-focused. Reappraisal means that the individualreappraises or cognitively r??valu?tes a potentially emotion-elicitingsituation in terms that decrease itsemotional impact. The second#p#分页标题#e#strategy we have focused on is suppression, a type of response modulation, and thus response-focused.Suppression means that an individual inhibits ongoing emotionexpressive behavior.3 In the following sections, I describe our findingsconcerning the affective, cognitive,and social consequences of reappraisal and suppression.Affective Consequences ofEmotion RegulationReappraisal occurs early in theemotion-generative process and involves cognitively neutralizing apotentially emotion-eliciting situation. Thus, reappraisal should decrease experiential, behavioral, andphysiological responding. By contrast, suppression occurs later andrequires active inhibition of theemotion-expressive behavior thatis generated as the emotion unfolds. Thus, suppression shouldnot change emotion experience atall, but should increase physiological activation as a result of the effort expended in inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behavior.To test these predictions, weneeded to elicit emotion in the laboratory. Researchers have used avariety of methods, including music, obnoxious confederates, andfilms, to elicit emotion. Films havethe advantage of being readilystandardized, and of provokinghigh levels of emotion in an ethically acceptable way (Gross & Levenson, 1995). To examine the affective consequences of emotionregulation, we used a short filmthat showed a disgusting arm amputation (Gross, 1998a). In the reappraisal condition, participantswere asked to think about the filmthey were seeing in such a way(e.g., as if it were a medical teaching film) that they would not respond emotionally. In the suppression condition, participants wereasked to hide their emotional reactions to the film. In the naturalcondition, participants simplywatched the film.As expected, suppression decreased disgust-expressive behavior, but also increased physiologicalactivation. For example, participantsin the suppression condition hadgreater constriction of their bloodvessels than participants in the natural condition. Like suppression,reappraisal decreased expressive behavior. Unlike suppression, however, reappraisal had no observable physiological consequences.4Another predicted difference wasthat reappraisal decreased the experience of disgust, whereas suppression did not.Related studies have confirmedand extended these findings. InPublished by Blackwell Publishers Inc.CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 217creases in physiological activationalso have been found when participants suppress amusement andsadness (Gross & Levenson, 1993,1997). Note that there are no suchincreases in physiological activation when people "suppress" during a neutral film. This shows thatthe physiological impact of suppression grows out of pitting attempts to inhibit expressionagainst strong impulses to express.#p#分页标题#e#Absent a stimulus that producesemotional impulses, suppression hasno impact on physiological responding. The finding that reappraisaldecreases emotional respondinghas recently been replicated usinga behavioral measure (the magnitude of a startle response to a loudnoise burst) as an index of emotional state (Jackson, Malmstadt,Larson, & Davidson, 2000).Cognitive Consequences ofEmotion RegulationSuppression is a form of emotion regulation that requires selfmonitoring and self-corrective action throughout an emotionalevent. Such monitoring requires acontinual outlay of cognitive resources, reducing the resourcesavailable for processing events sothat they can be remembered later.Reappraisal, by contrast, is evokedearlyon in the emotion-generativeprocess. Therefore, this strategytypically does not require continual self-regulatory effort during anemotional event. This would makecostly self-regulation unnecessary,leaving memory intact.We tested these predictions inseveral interlocking studies (Richards & Gross, 2000). In one study,participants viewed slides underone of three conditions: reappraisal, suppression, or a "justwatch" control. Slides depicted injured men, and information concerning each man was providedorally as each slide was presented.Suppression led to worse performance on a memory test for information presented during slideviewing. Reappraisal did not.To see whether our laboratoryfindings would generalize to everyday life, we examined memoryand individual differences in emotion regulation, measured with theEmotion Regulation Questionnaire(Gross & John, 2001). Individualswith high scores on the Suppression scale of the questionnaire reported having worse memory thanindividuals with low Suppressionscores. They also performed worseon an objective memory test inwhich participants were asked torecall events they had listed in adaily diary 1 week earlier. By contrast, Reappraisal scores had no relationship to either self-reported orobjective memory. Together, thesefindings suggest that whereas suppression is cognitively costly, reappraisal is not.Social Consequences ofEmotion RegulationEmotions serve important socialfunctions. Thus, emotion regulation should have social consequences, and different regulationstrategies should have differentconsequences. As postulated in mymodel, reappraisal selectively alters the meaning of an emotioneliciting situation. In emotionallynegative situations, reappraisal de#p#分页标题#e#creases negative emotion-expressivebehavior, but does not decrease positive behavior. Suppression, by contrast, decreases both negative andpositive emotion-expressive behavior. This decrease in positive emotion-expressive behavior should interfere with social interaction,leading to negative reactions inother individuals.To test this prediction, we askedunacquainted pairs of women toview an upsetting film, and then discuss their reactions (Butler, Egloff,Wilhelm, Smith, & Gross, 2001). Unbeknownst to the other, one member of each dyad had been asked toeither suppress her emotions, reappraise the meaning of the film, orinteract naturally with her conversation partner. We expected suppression to decrease both negativeand positive emotion-expressivebehavior in the regulator. Positiveemotion expressions are a key element of social support, and socialsupport decreases physiological responses to Stressors (Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). Wetherefore reasoned that the diminished positive emotion-expressivebehavior shown by participantswho suppressed their emotionswould produce large physiologicalresponses in their interaction partners. By contrast, we did not expectparticipants given the reappraisalinstructions to show decreasedpositive emotion-expressive behavior. We therefore expected thattheir interaction partners wouldhave physiological responses comparable to those of the partners ofparticipants who acted naturally.Figure 2 shows that partners ofparticipants asked to suppresstheir emotions had greater increases in blood pressure thanpartners of participants given reappraisal instructions or asked to actnaturally. Interacting with a partner who shows little positive emotion is more physiologically activating than interacting with apartner who shows greater positiveemotion. This finding extends priorwork by Fredrickson and Levenson(1998), who showed that positiveemotions speed cardiovascular recovery from negative emotions.Emotion-regulation strategies thatincrease (or at least maintain) positive emotion should be calming forboth the regulator and the interaction partner, whereas strategiesthat diminish positive emotionshould increase physiological responses of both the regulator andthe interaction partner.Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society218 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 20013530S)25Mu w o&? 20C?HO15 15S 10Partner Partner PartnerReappraises Natural Suppresses#p#分页标题#e#Fig. 2. Social consequences of emotion regulation. Mean change in blood pressure isshown separately for individuals whose conversation partnerswere asked to reappraise the situation, act naturally, or suppress their emotions (Butler, Egloff, Wilhelm, Smith, & Gross, 2001).DIRECTIONS FORFUTURE RESEARCHMy model suggests that adjustments made early in the emotiontrajectory are more effective thanadjustments made later on. Thefindings I have reviewed supportthis prediction. Reappraisal decreases expressive behavior andemotion experience, and does notadversely affect physiological responding, memory, or the regulator’s interaction partner. Suppression, by contrast, has no impact onemotion experience, impairs memory, and increases physiological responding in both the regulator andthe partner.One direction for future researchis to learn more about emotion regulation at each step in the emotiongenerative process. This review hasfocused on one type of cognitivechange and one type of responsemodulation. Do other forms of cognitive change and response modulation have similar consequences?Moreover, what are the differencesamong the antecedent-focused strategies of situation selection, situationmodification, cognitive change, andattentional deployment? Similarly,what are the differences among theresponse-focused strategies?A second important direction forfuture research is to explore thelong-term consequences of differingemotion-regulation strategies. Ihave largely focused here on the immediate effects of reappraisal andsuppression. However, if there areconsistent individual differences inemotion and emotion regulation,such differences might have cumulative effects. For example, eachtime emotion is suppressed, physiological responses are magnified.Any one physiological response ofincreased intensity is unlikely tohave deleterious consequences. Butif such responses recur day afterday after day, there might be adverse health consequences. A recentstudy illustrates how such a hypothesis might be tested. Heart attack survivors were divided intofour groups, depending on theirdistress and their tendency to suppress emotion (Denollet et al., 1996).The subgroup scoring high on bothdistress and suppression had a significantly higher death rate (27%)than other patients (7%). This finding suggests that suppression indeed has important cumulativehealth consequences.A third direction for future research is to explore whether peopleregulate emotional impulses in the#p#分页标题#e#same way as physical impulsessuch as hunger, aggression, andsexual arousal. Do strategies thathelp people stay emotionally coolalso help them avoid eating thatextra piece of cake, or steer clear ofthat tempting adulterous relationship? Or must each type of impulsebe handled differently? Answers tosuch questions are of rich theoretical interest, and will also havegreat practical value for educationand therapy.Recommended ReadingGross, J.J. (1998a). (See References)Gross, J.J. (1999a). (See References)Richards, J.M., & Gross, J.J. (2000).(See References)Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 219Acknowledgments?Preparation of thisarticle was supported by Grant MH53859from the National Institute of MentalHealth. I would like to thank Jo-Anne Bachorowski, Lisa Feldman Barrett, BarbFredrickson, Oliver John, Ann Kring,Sonja Lyubomirsky, Jane Richards, SteveSutton, and Jeanne Tsai for their helpfulcomments.Notes1. Address correspondencetoJames J. Gross, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford,CA 94305-2130; e-mail: [email protected]; http://www-psych.Stanford, edu/^psyphy/.2. This review focuses on emotionregulationin adults. For a recent review of emotion regulation in childhood, see Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie,and Reiser (2000).3. The term "reappraisal" has along history. Although some researchers find it confusing because it suggeststhat there is an initial appraisal that isthen reworked, I use it for historicalcontinuity. My focus here is on reappraisal that is used to cognitively transform apotentially negative-emotioninducing situation so as to reduce itsemotional impact. The term "suppression" also has a long history. It has Ibeen used to refer to inhibiting feelings, behavior, or thoughts. Here I useit to refer to inhibiting emotion-expressive behavior.4. One puzzle is why reappraisaldid not decrease physiological responding in this study. The potencyand brevity of the surgical film mayhave made it difficult for participantsto curtail their physiological responsesin the time specified.ReferencesButler, E.A., Egloff, B., Wilhelm, F.H., Smith, N.C.,& Gross, J.J. (2001). The social consequences ofemotion regulation. Manuscript submitted forpublication.Denollet, J., Sys, S.U., Stroobant, N., Rombouts, H.,Gillebert, T.C., & Brutsaert, D.L. (1996). Personality as independent predictor of long-term#p#分页标题#e#mortality in patients with coronary heart disease. The Lancet, 347,417-421.Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R.A., Guthrie, I.K., & Reiser,M. (2000). Dispositional emotionality and regulation: Their role in predicting quality of social functioning. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 78,136-157.Fredrickson, B.L., & Levenson, R.W. (1998). Positive emotions speed recovery from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions.Cognition & Emotion, 12,191-220.Gross, J.J. (1998a). Antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation: Divergent consequences for experience, expression, and Iphysiology. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 74,224-237.Gross, J.J. (1998b). The emerging field of emotionregulation: An integrative review. Review ofGeneral Psychology, 2,271-299.Gross, J.J. (1999a). Emotion and emotion regulation. In LA. Pervin & O.P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed.,pp. 525-552). New York: Guilford.Gross, J.J. (1999b). Emotion regulation: Past, present, future. Cognition & Emotion, 13,551-573.Gross, J.J., & John, O.P. (2001). Individual differencesin emotion regulation processes: Consequences foraffect, well-being, and relationships. Manuscriptsubmitted for publication.Gross, J.J., & Levenson, R.W. (1993). Emotionalsuppression: Physiology, self-report, and expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64,970-986.Gross, J.J.,& Levenson, R.W. (1995). Emotion elicitation using films. Cognition & Emotion, 9,87-108.Gross, J.J., & Levenson, R.W. (1997). Hiding feelings: The acute effects of inhibiting positiveand negative emotions. Journal of AbnormalPsychology, 106,95-103.Jackson, D.C., Malmstadt, J.R., Larson, C.L., &Davidson, R.J. (2000). Suppression and enhancement of emotional responses to unpleasant pictures. Psychophysiology, 37,515-522.Richards, J.M., & Gross, J.J. (2000). Emotion regulation and memory: The cognitive costs ofkeeping one’s cool. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 79,410-424.Uchino, B.N., Cacioppo, J.T., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J.K.(1996). The relationship between social support and physiological processes: A reviewwith emphasis on underlying mechanismsand implications for health. Psychological Bulletin, 229,488-531.Cognitive Biases and Emotional Wisdomin the Evolution of Conflict Betweenthe SexesDavid M. Buss1Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas


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